3 favorite causes from interference by the government.
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the history of the expressive association right and its relationship to antidiscrimination law. Part II argues that Dale provides a constitutional defense to antidiscrimination laws by nonprofit organizations when the organizations' ideology requires discrimination. As discussed in Part II, both white and black racist and racialist groups have a right to exclude members of other races.
The rest of this Article shows that despite the political left's hostility to Dale, two causes associated with the left may ultimately be among the most significant beneficiaries of Dale. Part III explains that the most significant nonprofit organizations with an ideological commitment to discrimination are not overtly racist organizations, but elite private universities that engage in racial preferences in favor of minority applicants. Private universities faced with reverse discrimination lawsuits may find constitutional respite in the right to expressive association if they are willing to admit that they engage in racial preferences.
Part IV opines that private university speech codes are protected by Dale. California's Leonard Law 7 essentially makes such speech codes illegal, 8 and several state constitutions arguably do the same. 9 When Stanford University defended its speech code on expressive association grounds, the court relied on Roberts in upholding the constitutionality of the Leonard Law. 10 After Dale, however, state regulations banning private schools from enforcing speech codes should be invalidated on expressive association grounds. Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 543 (1987) ; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 615 (1984) ; Isbister v Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212, 220 (Cal. 1985) .
13 468 U. S. 609 (1984) .
14 United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. 1981) .
15 United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (D. Minn. 1982 ), rev'd, 709 F.2d 1560 , 1561 (8th Cir. 1983 , rev'd subnom., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609 (1984) .
I. A Brief Overview of Dale and the Right of Expressive Association
As noted in the introduction, the Supreme Court first explicitly recognized the right to expressive association in the 1950s, when state harassment threatened the viability of civil rights organizations in the South. The right was ill-defined for the next several decades; for example, it was unclear whether the right originated in the First Amendment or was part of a more general right to association derived from the Due Process Clause or elsewhere.
In the 1980s, litigants aggressively asserted the right of expressive association as a defense to ever more intrusive public accommodations statutes. 12 This forced the Supreme Court to clarify the origins and scope of the right.
The most important expressive association case was Roberts v. United States Jaycees.
13
The national Jaycees organization threatened two Minnesota chapters with expulsion for admitting women as full members. The state chapters sued, claiming that the national organization's policy violated Minnesota's public accommodations law. 14 The national Jaycees defended its membership policy on First Amendment grounds. After a short-lived victory for the national Jaycees in the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court reversed. 15 The Court stated that the right to associate for expressive purposes was implicitly protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, 16 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618. 17 Id. at 627-28. In fact, Rotary International's amicus brief pointed to the "gender gap" in political views. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Rotary International at 18, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) .
18 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627. 19 Id. at 624. 20 Id.
21
For criticism of the notion that a single state's law creates a compelling interest for First Amendment purposes, see Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 165 F.3d 692, 716 (9th Cir. 1999 ) ("Nor, would it seem, can a single state's law evince-under any standard-a compelling government interest for federal constitutional purposes."), rev 'd on other grounds, 220 F.3d 1134 'd on other grounds, 220 F.3d (9th Cir. 2000 . For support of such reasoning, see Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1, 46 (1987) (Newman, J., concurring) ("an interest need not be national in scope to be compelling"). See generally Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1987) (District of Columbia's compelling interest in suppressing speech cannot trump First Amendment rights).
5
and to petition government. 16 However, the Court found that the national Jaycees could not successfully assert a First Amendment right to expressive association because there was no evidence that the compelled acceptance of women as Jaycees would "change the content or impact of the organization's speech." 17 The Court implausibly argued that admitting women required no change in the organization's central purpose: "promoting the interests of young men."
18
Moreover, even if Minnesota's public accommodations law infringed on the Jaycees' right to expressive association, it did so to advance compelling interests, i.e., eliminating gender discrimination and ensuring "equal access to publicly available goods and services." 19 Because the law served compelling government interests, it trumped the Jaycees' First Amendment rights.
Although the interest in forcing the Jaycees to admit women was purportedly compelling, 160, 175-76 (1976) . It is true that the brief of Petitioner Southern Indep. Sch. Ass'n (pp. 26-27): "If the SISA parents have a right to select a school for their children that expresses their own preferences and beliefs, is that right invaded by the decisions below? Clearly so. Every parent who selects a SISA school because of a belief that 'segregation is desirable in education' has lost any opportunity of expressing that belief if by the Thirteenth or any other amendment all public or private schools must become desegregated." At 26-27. Morever, the Reply Brief adds: "[T]he . . . proposals to eliminate or integrate the SISA schools are directly related to the restriction of communication by the SISA parents --to the point of eliminating the last refuge in which their belief can presently find expression. The responding briefs claim that SISA parents will remain free to believe in the value of segregation in education --but argue the contradictory provision that this belief must only be expressed in an integrated private school." At 8. However, these are not arguments that the schools' ability to teach that segregation is good would be decreased, but that the parents could not express their beliefs in segregation by sending their kids to a segregated school. Indeed, the petitioner's argument would also apply to a restaurant patron who claimed that the 1964 Civil Rights Act prevents him from expressing his belief in segregation by going to a segregated restaurant. Dale stands for the principle that the government cannot force association that would dilute an organized group's message, not that individuals have a right to associate with whom they please because otherwise they will not be able to express their belief in segregation. 43 The Roberts Court at one point seemed to adopt this argument, though it did not rely upon it for its holding. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628. 10 association rights to for-profit organizations, 40 the holding of Runyon will survive Dale.
Even more important, a close reading of Runyon and the briefs filed in it reveal that
Runyon was not an "expressive association" case. The defendants in Runyon made what amounts to a short, throwaway argument that their right to "freedom of association," floating somewhere in the penumbral ether of the Constitution, was violated by compelled integration. However, the defendants did not make an expressive association claim grounded in the First Amendment. They did not argue in their briefs that the schools' ability to promote segregation would be compromised, nor did they provide evidence at trial on that issue. 41 The Runyon Court's ruling was based on the fact that the defendants failed to allege, much less prove, that their expressive association rights were violated, not that a racist organization could never establish such a claim. Marceline Donaldson, a sixty-something African-American,former civil rights worker, closed her antique shop early to attend with her husband a speech by Louis Farrakhan at Boston's Strand Theater. Nation of Islam security turned her away, explaining that the meeting was for men only. "Being turned away at the door by a black man was overwhelming. When he moved me aside, my blood
12
Cleveland acted improperly when it refused to rent a public building to the Nation of Islam. The Nation planned to hold a men-only meeting in the Cleveland Convention Center in violation of Ohio's public accommodations statute. On motion for a declaratory judgment from the city, the court found for the Nation on what amounts to expressive association grounds. The court found that "[i]f the City is allowed to make the public accommodation law requiring Minister Farrakhan to speak to a mixed audience, the content and character of the speech will necessarily be changed." 48 The court avoided considering the city's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination, as seemingly required by Roberts, by couching its holding in general freedom of speech terms, rather than explicitly relying on the expressive association right. There is a great irony in the fact that Ms. Donaldson was eager to attend a talk given by the leader of a racist and anti-Semitic organization, but became angry only when the organization discriminated against her. 
III. Expressive Association and Racial Preferences in Private Universities
Overtly racist and sexist organizations are not the only private, non-profit, primarily expressive groups that have an ideology that leads them to discriminate. Many private universities seek to instill in their students an appreciation of the importance of racial diversity at the highest I put "diversity" in quotation marks because at many schools the concept seems limited to racial diversity, and even then non-left-wing members of racial minority groups are not thought to contribute to "diversity." See generally Eugene
Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2059 REV. (1996 . 
57
See Stephen L. Carter, Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby14 (1991) ("it sometimes seems as though the [affirmative action ] programs are not supposed to have any beneficiaries"); Lerner & Nagai, supra note _ (while there has been grudging acknowledgment that preferences are used, "very little information has been disclosed to the public"). -in their admissions process to achieve diverse student bodies.
Few schools directly admit that they engage in racial preferences. 57 Instead, their representatives hem and haw, expressing their commitment to "diversity" and affirmative action while also claiming that the minority students they accept are just as well-qualified as the white students. 58 Consider Dean Herma Hill Kay of Boalt Hall Law School's response when she was preferences as a means of ensuring crucial diversity while claiming that "racial diversity is a secondary interest," but not revealing the relevant statistical disparities between students admitted for "diversity" reasons and other students).
59 Thernstrom, supra note 49, at 19-20.
60 Id. at 20. Consider this memorandum, sent from Yale Law School associate dean Stephen Yandle to Yale law students, after admissions data had been released to a student writing a research paper on affirmative action:
[I]n light of the rumors that are circulating that certain individuals and groups --minority students and groups--have subpar credentials, I do want to say a bit about what could have been discovered from the information if a recipient had compromised confidentiality. One of the reports contains a grid with LSAT scorss in small bands on one axis and GPA's in small bands on the other. "Cells" are produced for the possible GPA and LSAT combinations. There are no minority students in the Law School whose credentials occupy a cell that is not also occupied by non-minority students or not adjacent to a cell occupied by non-minority students. In short there are no minority students whose individual credentials are statistically different from non-minority students. That is not to say that there are no differences among the credentials of students in this law school (although the differences are remarkably small), but to say that the range of credentials among minority students s congruent with the credential range of non-minority students. Another report shows mean credentials for students by ethnic group. It reveals that the mean LSAT for minority student is within the LSAT's standard error of measurement of the mean for non-minority students. When separate ethnic groups are broken out the variance changes only slightly in spite of the potential for greater variance as groups become quite small. The GPA differences among groups are similar in magnitude.
Memorandum from Stephen D. Yandle to Yale Law School Students, April 6, 1990 (reprinted with permission).
The point of this memo is to argue that any differences between minority and non-minority students are inconsequential.
In fact, however, a close reading reveals that there are no non-minority students who share the same admissions grid with the least credentialed minority students, and the memo does not say how many students are in each grid. Moreover, while the mean for minority students compared to white students is within the standard measurement of error for the LSATs (currently 2.7 points, see http://www.powerscore.com/scale.htm), the gap is greater than that for some minority groups' median. The most significant omission in the memo, however, is that Yale, as the most selective school in the country, gets the very best minority students, some of whom would be admitted regardless of race. Therefore, discussion of means significantly obscures the likelihood that the gap between the minority students with the lowest numbers--the ones who benefit most from racial preferences--and the class mean is quite large, and significantly larger than the gap between the median and the lowest-numbered non-minority students. The racial preferences in admission might be even more dramatic if medians rather than means were considered. race-neutral admissions policies would dilute their pro-"diversity" message. Not unreasonably, the administrators of elite universities believe that if the law prohibits them from utilizing racial 76 It will also, of course, become more difficult to aid minority students directly by admitting them, but this is not an interest protected by the expressive association right, but rather seems more like the general right of association that the Runyon Court held cannot justify discrimination. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 175-76.
77 For a passionate defense of affirmative action on these and other grounds, see Jamin B. Raskin, Affirmative Action and Racial Reaction, at http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/may95raskin.htm. Unfortunately, among other weaknesses in this article,
Raskin cannot resist what appears to be the common urge among proponents of racial preferences to accuse those who disagree with them of being racists. See generally infra note _.
It would aid the universities' case that basing admissions primarily on test scores and GPA is dubious if they refrained from applying this standard to all students except under represented minority students.
78
Dale at 2455.
79 Note, however, that a litigant probably would argue that universities are closer to the primarily non-expressive, commercial Jaycees organization than to the primarily expressive Boy Scouts. See Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 631-40 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). On the one hand, it is difficult to argue that universities are not primarily expressive. On the other hand, a university degree does confer economic advantages on its recipients that leadership in the Boy Scouts does not. S. 555 (1984) .
19
preferences, instead in effect requiring them to have an overwhelmingly white (and, increasingly, Asian-American) class, it will be far more difficult to promote to their students the ideals of racial diversity and assistance to disadvantaged minorities.
76
Moreover, having a racially-homogenous class inherently sends a negative or at best indifferent message about the importance of "diversity," thus diluting a university's pro-"diversity" message. Engaging in racial preferences on behalf of under-represented minorities, by contrast, sends a message to both students and the world at large that the university rejects applying dubious "meritocratic" standards in a society that has what many argue amounts to an entrenched racial hierarchy. 77 Recall that in Dale the Court held that the Boy Scouts had a First successful Title VI case against racial preferences would involve both a major infringement on the right of expressive association, and, because of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1990, jeopardize all of a university's federal funding, including federally-guaranteed student loans.
83
Since almost no colleges can survive without federal funding, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine may very well apply.
84
Ultimately, having universities successfully defend racial preferences on expressive association grounds would be a win-win situation. First, the right of private schools with an ideological commitment to promoting racial diversity to engage in racial preferences would be secure. Second, the litigation would force the universities to admit that they engage in racial preferences. Ideally, the schools would also provide details regarding the scope of their preferences so that the debate on affirmative action could proceed openly and honestly. Law School Admission> Asian-American students, however, might reasonably fear being discriminated against in law school admissions, since they have faced discrimination in undergraduate admissions for the sake of "diversity," especially at elite state schools in California. 88 For example, an early 1980s study of the nation's top ten law schools found that the average African-American student's GPA was at the eighth percentile of his class. ROBERT KLITGAARD, CHOOSING ELITES 162-63 (1985) . A late 1980s study showed that the mean law school GPA of African-American students in California was at "around the 15th percentile." See Stephen P. Klein, Passing Rates Among Racial/Ethnic Groups: Their Size, Source, and Implications, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 517, 524 (1991 School officials repeatedly tell African-American students that as a group they are just as qualified academically as their white classmates. Yet, when grades come in, it becomes clear that on average African-American students get significantly lower grades than whites. 88 A logical explanation for this anomaly is that universities are institutionally racist, and hidden racism is 89 This is not to deny that racism, institutional and otherwise, still exists on university campuses. Rather, I am arguing that at most schools, especially elite schools, such racism is not the primary cause of the academic difficulties faced by African-Americans.
Disparities in Bar Exam
90 For example, pseudo-scientific Afrocentricism is rampant in American universities, see MARY LEFKOWITZ, NOT OUT OF AFRICA: HOW AFROCENTRISM BECAME AN EXCUSE TO TEACH MYTH AS HISTORY (1997), and African-Americans are the only group in America whose level of anti-Semitism is positively correlated with youth and education. See, e.g., Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Editorial, Black Demagogues and Pseudo-Scholars, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1992 at A15 (condemning this trend of "top-down anti-Semitism, in large part the province of the better-educated classes").
91 Cf. Issacharoff, supra note 49, at 672-73 (arguing that while University of Texas admitted the extent of its racial preferences only in response to litigation, "it behooves any institution of higher education . . . to account for how it confers this important societal benefit."). Ironically, if Stanford were to reestablish its speech code, it may not be able to defend itself on expressive association grounds. In the litigation just discussed, Stanford claimed to be unreservedly "committed to the principals of free inquiry and free expression." The speech code itself stated that students have a "right to hold and vigorously defend and promote their opinions . . . Respect for this right requires that students tolerate even expression of opinions which they find abhorrent." Corry, supra note 98, at 37.
Even after Dale, it will be difficult for a school to win an expressive association case against the Leonard Law or similar litigation if the school refuses to argue that it believes that freedom of expression should be sacrificed to other ends.
Many schools that have speech codes seem unwilling to admit that they are in fact suppressing speech, instead claiming they are simply trying to obey Title VI or Title IX. To be entitled to a Dale defense, however, these schools will have to publicly acknowledge that their speech codes in fact restrict speech.
111 Andrew R. Varcoe, The Boy Scouts and the First Amendment: Constitutional Limits on the Reach of Anti-Discrimination Law, 9 LAW & SEX 163, 276 (1999 -2000 .
27
proved it promoted to some small degree a particular view of homosexual activity, and that 113 See Carter, supra note _, at 176 ("Very often, these [campus speech] codes are written in language easily broad enough to cover--that is, forbid--the speech of students who want to argue that other students, admitted because of explicit racial preferences, are less capable than students who were admitted without them. Many students, and not a few professors, have argued that the codes should be adopted with that idea in mind.); see generally D'SOUZA, supra note __, at 238-29 (On many campuses "there is a de facto taboo against a free discussion of affirmative action . . . and efforts to open such a discussion are considered presumptively racist.").
To some, criticizing racial preferences is itself inherently racist and should be censored. For example, the Chicago City Colleges' Board of Trustees sued a teachers' union for printing a satirical critique of affirmative action in its newsletter, and thus allegedly creating an illegal hostile environment. See Eugene Volokh, Is Criticizing Affirmative Action Illegal in Chicago?, JEWISH WORLD REV., Aug. 30, 1999 . At California State University in Northridge, one student editor was suspended for running a mocking cartoon of affirmative action. A second student was then suspended for criticizing the university's action against the first student. BERNSTEIN, DICATORSHIP OF VIRTUE, supra note 90, at 209. Another controversy over an affirmative action cartoon erupted at the University of New Mexico, with attendant cries of racism. See http://www.contumacy.org/4NHNT.html. As noted previously, see supra note 49, the student who initiated the controversy over racial preferences at Georgetown Law Center was denounced as a racist. See also http://mtprof.msun.edu/Fall1995/trout.html (citing various articles in which this student was denounces as a racist).
Of course, the fact that a private university has the right to make and enforce a speech code would not insulate that university from liability if it contractually bound itself to protect freedom of expression on campus.
114
But cf. Kennedy, Chronicle article, supra note __, at _ ("I can easily imagine a vibrant, rigorous, intellectually distinguished college whose governing authorities reject" the idea that the purpose of a university is to serve as an open marketplace of ideas.").
28
opprobrious ideas will evade anti-discrimination laws using Dale as a defense. If the Ku Klux Klan were to start a university devoted to promoting white supremacy 112 Dale would provide constitutional protection.
On the other hand, protecting the liberty of those whose views one hates also protects one's own liberty. Dale may allow the Boy Scouts to discriminate against gays, but it also should provide protection for private universities that discriminate in favor of Latino and African
American students, a favored cause on the left. Moreover, Dale's rejuvenation of the right of expressive association renders laws banning speech codes by private universities unconstitutional.
Because of Dale, not only will private universities likely have a constitutional to engage in racial preferences in admissions, but also a right to punish criticism of such preferences as racist.
113
A university that forbids criticism of its controversial racial preference policies is hardly everyone's ideal institution of higher learning, and in stifling free expression such a schools would run the risk of sacrificing educational excellence to political correctness. 114 But, then again,
115
Illiberal behavior may also have its benefits. See Nancy Rosenblum, Membership and Morals 327 (1999) ("I have highlighted the positive moral uses of incongruent associations that do not conform (and do not wish to conform) to liberal democratic norms. They may cultivate virtues, even if not peculiarly liberal or democratic ones, still moral dispositions that are appreciated in liberal democracy. They may contain vices, allowing them relatively safe expression. Where the conditions for shifting involvement exist, membership may compensate for a deficit of social experience in other areas.").
29
liberals of all stripes could boycott such universities and give their talents to universities that uphold liberal values. Permitting illiberal behavior to go unregulated can be infuriating.
Paradoxically, however, as the Court recognized in Dale, tolerating illiberal behavior is the price we pay for living in a liberal society.
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